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# WHY IS A REVOLUTION?

BY PAXTON HIBBEN

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As a nation, we find self-analysis painful. We do not cheerfully face disagreeable facts about ourselves. We are loath to believe that our progress to the position of eminence which we occupy in the world has been one of surprising rushes, interspersed with long periods of culpable torpor. As a nation among nations, we prefer not to act at all; but when we do, we generally act before we think. We do our thinking afterward, in the form of explanation and adjustment. We are peculiarly averse, however, to acknowledging this, even to ourselves. Instead, we affect an infantile irresponsibility touching our larger obligations. We are credulous only of what we wish to believe. In the last resort, we ridicule and belittle whatever disturbs our national self-absorption.

It is in this spirit of vexed levity that we have come to regard the frequent outbreaks which take place in our sister republics of this hemisphere. Their specter annoys us. Off with its head! Latin-American revolutions are dying out. They are mere opera bouffe. They are a relic of barbarism, cropping out among an essentially lawless people. What possible business is it of ours if our neighbors cut one another's throat? This view of the matter is pleasingly simple and would, no doubt, be a very comfortable way in which to dismiss the subject, were it a true one.

But it is not true. Revolutions in Latin-America, unfortunately, are not dying out. What is more, they have a very defensible reason for continuing; worse still, far from being nothing to us, we are directly responsible for the conditions which inspire them, and our general attitude toward Latin-American countries even now abets and encourages them. Moreover, though the nations of the world look to us and to us alone to do something about it, we

have done and are doing nothing whatever of practical value really to solve the problem. Indeed, an attempt is being made of late to clothe this inaction with the dignity of a foreign policy. We spend a great deal of money on highly ornamental Pan-American Congresses; we frequently send special missions to this or that sister republic and, on appropriate occasions, point with pride to the friendly relations which have happily always existed between ourselves and the countries to the south of us. But the Latin-American revolutions continue; human beings are shot; property is destroyed; our citizens are abused and put upon—and we are satisfied to take no action.

The newspaper that reports the outbreak of a revolutionary movement in this country or that gives few, if any, details. The extent of the havoc wrought by revolution is known only to those who have seen. A revolution may indeed be a rather rough-and-ready means of changing the administration; but it may also be a horrible war of extermination. In countries like Paraguay and El Salvador, wars of this latter character have reduced the male population to a proportion of one man for about eight women. Participants have told me of battles after which every helplessly wounded man of either side was killed by the victors—there were, of course, no field hospitals; there rarely are. Defeated leaders have been beheaded and their heads carried in triumph by the victorious army; prisoners have been shot in companies, their faces to an adobe wall; non-combatants have been robbed, raped, and murdered. And these things happen to-day, just as they did five hundred years ago.

Less than two years ago don Augusto Leguía, President of Peru, was hunted out of his palace and dragged through the streets by a mob. They stood him up before the stone base of a monument to one of the liberators of the country, in a public plaza of Lima, and made it very clear to him that he must resign the presidency of the republic there and at once. A screaming negro stood over him, a naked machete in hand, begging to be allowed to behead him. But the President did not resign. Just at this juncture some of the army of the republic, which receives its pay from the President, turned into the plaza. When the smoke had cleared away, somewhat bloody but unharmed, don Augusto Leguía made a colonel of the lieutenant

commanding the soldiers and returned to the profitable business of being President of Peru.

Not many months ago the regular election to choose the successor of Señor Leguía was held in Peru. There were two aspirants to the office: don Guillermo Billinghurst and don Antero Aspíllaga. The business of Peru stopped for the four days of the election, while armed mobs paraded the streets; houses were burned, dramshops were looted, and a number of people were shot. After it was all over neither Señor Aspíllaga nor Señor Billinghurst was President of Peru. Don Augusto Leguía was still tenaciously clinging to that office and it required some three months to persuade him of the election of Señor Billinghurst, his own candidate. All of this happened just a little while since—but there was nothing about it in our newspapers.

For four years, General Eloy Alfaro was President of Ecuador—a popular man at first and the leader of the Liberals. Under him, as his Minister in the adjacent country of Colombia, served General Julio Andrade. At the death of President Estrada, Alfaro's successor, Generals Eloy Alfaro and Leonidas Plaza fell to fighting over the succession to the presidency. General Andrade joined Plaza against his former chief; and Plaza, thanks to him, was victorious. Alfaro and his associates were shot, beheaded, dragged through the streets, and publicly burned by mobs. General Plaza was provisional President; General Andrade was one of his Ministers. Within two months, Andrade, who had served Alfaro, who had served Plaza against Alfaro, plotted to overthrow Plaza and seize the presidency himself. General Plaza did not hesitate; he had Andrade shot.

The *dénouements* of these two incidents took place about a year ago, in countries both of which are nearer the Panama Canal than New Orleans is; in the two countries we have, invested, almost fifty million dollars.

Now we of the United States do not understand this sort of thing at all. People who behave in this shocking way either are unbalanced people, whom one cannot take seriously, or they are wanton triflers with the sacred principles of democracy. In any case, to us it seems both very needless and very uncivilized. The people of such countries must be totally unfit for self-government and, when we think of them at all, we conceive them as being more or less black, scantily clothed, and very excitable. Even those of us who

should have knowledge of such matters consider our Latin-American neighbors as sentimental, impractical people, unstable, and lacking in any fundamental sense of honesty or of justice. That it may be just possible that there is another side to the medal does not occur to us; nor has what the Latin-American, in his turn, thinks of us ever occupied the attention of either the people of the United States or the State Department long enough really to be found out.

This is unfortunate. For there are about seventy-five millions of people in South and Central America and the independent islands of the Caribbean, whose imports already reach the sum of a billion dollars annually; and we, who are nearest them, sell them less than a quarter of what they buy abroad. But it is unfortunate for a much more vital and far-reaching reason than any commercial one.

Almost ninety years ago we guaranteed, politically, to the countries of Europe, and by inference to all the world, what Mr. Monroe called "the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it"; and since that time we have repeatedly reasserted that guarantee, as specifically as it were possible to put it into words. In recent years indeed we have added a very admirable and unequivocal statement, for all who run to read, of what we consider decent and proper behavior on the part of the people of those countries, and of the pains and penalties consequent on a failure to conform to this standard—albeit we have done very little to enforce the penalties. By this, our national guarantee, we have assumed a very grave responsibility toward all the nations of the world—a responsibility which they naturally look to us to discharge with honor and without chicanery. We have not always done so; rather we have sought to evade our responsibility, so long as its discharge insured us no immediate material benefits. But as the world's trade with Latin-America grows, and as the stability of the governments of the Latin-American republics passes from a matter of purely local to a matter of international concern, it is plain that we must either maintain our guarantee fairly, or we must purge ourselves of our responsibility as publicly as we assumed it. Twice in the past two years representatives of European powers have asked our Government what we intended to do about the wretched state of affairs in Mexico; our assurances were in the nature of excuse and avoidance. Yet our first duty

is unquestionably toward those countries whom we have informed that we could not view any interposition for the purpose of controlling in any manner the destinies of the Latin-American republics in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward us. And our second duty is to the people whose independence we thereby guaranteed. Both are very positive obligations. They cannot be discharged by mere words. They cannot, with honor, be shifted, evaded, or denied.

In his message of December 6, 1904, the President of the United States said:

"All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

No one could desire a cleaner statement of the duty accruing to us under the Monroe Doctrine. It is in the discharge of this duty that we are culpable. It is charged, and it is true, that we have, especially recently, attuned our performance of this moral obligation to the advantage of certain influential business interests. We have exercised the police power only where its exercise has profited certain American investors; where the disturbance of present conditions, however bad they may be, would upset the financial arrangements of those who are heard with respect in Washington, we have been blind to both chronic wrongdoing and impotence. Of this the Latin-American republics have not been ignorant and of this such countries as Guatemala and Colombia have taken what advantage they may. Only a just contempt of us in Latin-America can result from any exercise of our police power which is not absolutely consistent and absolutely impartial.

Now this can be accomplished in one of two ways: we can either coerce each and every turbulent Latin-American republic into conducting its affairs as we think they should be conducted (and that is not so impossible as one thinks),

or we can go about achieving our ends and those of civilization in a more Machiavellian manner. Assuming a general antipathy to the use of force as the sole means of maintaining stability, order, and prosperity in Latin-America, any other course requires first of all that we understand our Latin-American as he is, not as we should like or have grown accustomed to think him; as the astute adviser of princes instructed his diplomats, we must learn the character of the people with whom we have to deal in this affair. British, Germans, French, Scandinavians, even Italians, we know; they form part of our heterogeneous political entity. But with the character of Portuguese and Spaniards we have little experience; far less with the racial precipitate resulting from four centuries of adding this blood to that of Indians of such totally divergent types as those which people the lands to the south of us. We must ask, then: what *is* the Brazilian, the Costa Rican, the Venezuelan, and the rest—and why does he behave as he does? And we must find out.

We know that he lives under much the same idealistic application of the theories of Rousseau that handicap us, and that he comes no nearer their realization than we. If his failure in this respect seems more conspicuous than ours, he is at least more candid about it. Our political hypocrisy may confuse us; he knows that his is but the lip service of any real liberty. He is the individualist undefiled. That communistic end toward which our democracy is stumbling, to him is the veriest mirage; one cannot imagine a Latin patriot even conceiving government of the people, by the people, for the people. His is an absolute rule of the majority, not by any means necessarily a majority of votes, but of those units of political domination which we, ourselves, have found to be vastly more potent than mere numbers. But where the divisions of our political units are along the lines of class, occupation, habitat, and, to some extent, principle, his follow the more individual considerations of family, church, ambition, and profit. With him as with us, political conviction is oftenest mere prejudice; but with him active participation in politics is primarily a business—and it is the most paying business open to him.

To the prosecution of this business he brings a singleness of purpose, a personal fearlessness, and a boldness and

shrewdness of method not to be despised. To achieve his end, which is simply a comfortable livelihood without too much effort, he affiliates himself with one of the two or more political parties, theoretically divided upon liberal and conservative lines, but actually without any other fundamental distinction than the position given the Church. In allying himself with a party, however, he is neither sentimental about it nor does he deceive himself respecting the function of political parties in democratic government; with him, a party is a means, not an end; his affiliation with one party lasts so long as it is useful to him—no longer.

For, with the exception of the Church problem, to which there are very evidently two sides, the declared political purposes of opposing groups of politicians in Latin-America are in seeming disagreement merely upon matters of administrative and governmental expediency, while the real source of the opposition of parties lies in the designs of the individuals identified with them. In a word, there are but two political camps in a Latin-American republic: those who are in power and who profit therefrom, and those who are not in power but who desire and will go any lengths to achieve what their opponents possess. To these respective ends, each party seeks to distinguish itself with as clever and as able leaders as possible, and to conciliate as many units of political influence as it can. Of the latter, the Church and the army are the more valuable, but classes of people following certain occupations are also important, and much more readily tractable. Thus, in the Argentine Republic, the wheat and cattle kings wield enormous influence, as do the banana-planters in Costa Rica and the mining interests of Bolivia.

If, then, by some injudicious administrative measure, the politicians in power in a given country alienate from their support the Church, the army, the bankers, or some wealthy and influential family, the unit of influence so estranged is added to the ranks of the opposition; and the separation of this one political unit from the party in power may very well serve to turn its majority of such units into a minority. In that event, the Government must, of course, and does, change at once. The change may be, and in some countries generally is, effected peaceably; but in far the greater part of the Latin-American republics, and at some time in every one, the exact practical value of a political disaffection from



the ruling party is to be ascertained only by a direct return to the very bases of democracy, the arbitrament of force. To the Latin-American, therefore, revolution is often the sole logical method of deciding which disputing group of professional politicians shall hold office. It is more than that. It is often, too, the sole practical method of giving this decision effect.

In this lies the *raison d'être* of revolution in Latin-America, in his own eyes. From his birth to his death, he is everywhere confronted with conditions, not theories—and he must and does, for his intellectual salvation, make theories to fit the conditions. From the pulpits, the hoardings, the specious columns of a prolific press, the people of Latin-America tell themselves that this is the way to liberty—and are persuaded. Why should they not be? What they have is evidently neither freedom nor even security; their only hope is in constant change whence, one day, may emerge the desired state of happiness. Plainly, then, it is not that the people are turbulent and unstable, as we pretend; it is rather simply that they are so literal, so relentlessly logical in their pursuit of the Rousseauistic ideal of democracy with which we saddled them. We of the United States have been content on more than one occasion—the last very recently—to accept the rule of a President chosen by a minority of all the people. Our course may have been both wise and practical, but no one will maintain that it was not more a betrayal of the principles of representative government than, for example, the disastrous Chilean revolution of 1891, fought between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government.

It would appear from all of this that revolution in Latin-America is neither a mischievous habit nor, at bottom, chronic wrong-doing and impotence; that, quite the contrary, it is a not unwarranted means to a very desirable end. To pretend that revolutions in Latin-America are mere wantonness is unfair and unreasonable; to pretend that they have ceased or are ceasing to exist is stupid. More than a year ago the representative of the division of Latin-American affairs of the State Department endeavored, in a public speech, to create the impression that revolutions in South America are mere specters “decked out with the paraphernalia of melodramatic exaggeration by the facile pen of our well-informed press,” as he put it. As a matter of fact, the service of our

well-informed press is not, unfortunately, sufficiently complete to give any adequate idea of the revolutions which do occur; but our diplomatic service is, and our Government cannot be ignorant that, during the past four years, in seventeen of the twenty Latin-American republics there has been one or more armed rebellions against the existing Government, all of which—an average of more than five per year—resulted in destruction of property and loss of human life. Of the remaining three more pacific countries, one is under a virtual United States protectorate. Certainly it is not by the folly of seeking to deceive ourselves as to the facts nor by any sweeping condemnation of all political unrest in Latin-America that we can be of aid to the countries so harassed. If we would discharge the duty which we have imposed upon ourselves by the Monroe Doctrine, we must acknowledge and understand conditions, and then endeavor to meet them as they are.

I have said that the primal justification of revolution to the Latin-American is that it is often, in his conception, the sole practical method of learning which of two claimants has a real majority of those units of influence upon which the right to rule, in any democracy, is based. The Latin is nothing if not logical and, in America at least, he rejects as purely academic the suggestion that this conflict be decided by a counting of votes. Aside from the indisputable fact that the great mass of the people are totally incapable of an intelligent exercise of the suffrage, to the lucid mind of the Latin a trained and equipped army is worth something like five times its numbers in simple citizens of the republic. As the right of the majority to rule is based upon the conceded ability of the majority to maintain itself by force, any majority not obtained by counting the soldier as the equivalent of five civilians is merely a paper majority, a fiction of theorists. There is no grown man in any Latin-American republic who might not have seen this proved, in his own country. He believes, with Lincoln, that a majority always changing easily with popular opinion, is the only true sovereign of a free people; but he insists upon a point which we pass somewhat lightly over: the willingness of the majority to change *easily*. If it will not, he claims on any and every occasion, if he so choose, the right of appeal to the first principles of majority rule which we ourselves exercised in 1861. And

the practical result of these appeals when made only fortifies him in his conviction that, in computing working majorities, the weight of mere numbers is of very minor significance compared with the possession of money, arms, the influence of the Church, or a score of other decisive factors of public opinion.

One can scarcely charge, on these grounds at least, that the Latin-American is impractical or even undemocratic. Neither is he sentimental. No devotion to the theory of popular government has ever yet led any Latin-American statesman to try to saddle an apathetic proletariat with the responsibility for the errors of those to whom government is a business and a source of profit; he is not a political welcher. Neither does he use popular suffrage to confuse the political conscience of the common people, by forcing ballots on every conceivable subject. The part of the plain people in his democracies is a very real one indeed, but it is not played by making marks on a large sheet of paper covered with printed names, nor by lifting little ratchets and throwing over a lever. They do not vote; they do not care to vote. Their ancestors did not rebel against Spain or Portugal to be eternally bothered with casting ballots. They objected principally to the imported office-holder and all his train; they hated to produce wealth year after year simply to see it disappear from the country. They still feel that way—hence their savage bitterness toward the foreigner. But whether Dr. Eduardo Ramírez of Concepción or General Abraham Martínez of Santa Rosalia comes to power is a matter of complete indifference to the peon. He knows that there is no real basal disagreement in the purposes of the two; but he knows, also, that neither General Martínez nor Dr. Ramírez will ever forget to reckon with his mob. Sailing too close to the wind of popular indignation is one of the surest methods of political and often actual suicide; the judgments of the common people may be infrequent, but they are swift and terrible.

Here, then, is one kind of true democracy. No political leader may rest secure in the consciousness that there can be no further expression of the will of the people for two or four years. Revolution is not only a means of distinguishing a working majority and a method of securing to such a majority the control to which it is entitled; it is also the unfailing redress of an oppressed or neglected proletariat.

So far, revolution may seem an excellent institution which it would be absurd to discourage. That is not, however, the impression I would give. I desire merely to make it quite clear that the frequent revolutions in Latin-America are neither wholly indefensible nor evidences of any fundamental lack of reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters on the part of those who have recourse to them. They are, indeed, simply a means to the realization of a conception of democracy neither better nor worse, but different from our own—a conception essentially Latin, which we only retard our purpose by condemning offhand. The fear of revolution is one of the safeguards of liberty in any country; it is into the seeming intemperance of Latin-Americans in their appeal to this last resort that we must inquire.

Certain dramatists and short-story writers to the contrary notwithstanding, there is nothing of opera bouffe in a Latin-American revolution. Grotesque they may be. There is something ludicrous about the proportion of officers to common soldiers. A combination of gold-braided coats and bare feet is certainly fantastic. But the arms of this curiously dressed, undisciplined rabble are as efficacious as those of a properly uniformed private in the German army. Their work is death in Central America as elsewhere. Indeed, a battle-field is rather more ghastly there than if the struggle had taken place in the Balkans, or anywhere else in Europe. There are few of the conveniences of modern warfare in Latin-America. There are, however, all of its horrors. One would think, then, that a people who had once passed through the disastrous experience of a revolution would be willing to sacrifice something of the principles of democracy rather than again face poverty, disease, and death in that form. And so, of course, they would, were it not for another element of the problem. Primordially, revolutions in Latin-America may have been the manifestation of a much more admirable and a much less compromising devotion to liberty than is ours—or theirs, either—to-day. For with them as with us the commercial spirit of the age has poisoned the ideal of democracy. The reasons of Latin-Americans for their revolutions were originally, and may sometimes yet be, of the highest. But the practical cause of the frequency of revolution now is much more often that there is profit in it.

And by profit I do not mean merely the financial profit of the man who is dictator for a few years and who escapes unassassinated with what he has been able to secure by one means or another; I mean that there is some profit in it for every one, save the rare man of peace and the foreign investor. Those who are defeated have had a congenial, not very exacting, if extra-hazardous employment, for so long as they have been able to maintain the struggle. They have requisitioned their supplies from the estates through which they have passed; they have secured funds by robbing the Government customs-houses and *estancos*, by collecting imposts and levying taxes. The very peon in the ranks has fed of the fat of the land and looted grogshops for his drink. He had nothing to lose, to begin with, but an adobe cabin and an acre of ground somewhere; to these he returns in any case, if he be alive at the end of the war. Whether he is fighting or not, he must work from dawn to dark to keep body and soul together; generally speaking, he is better fed and better clothed, and his work is much less arduous as a soldier than as a laborer. As for the officers who make up the immediate supporters of the revolutionary leader, they have not fared badly, either, considering that they have daily risked their lives. They are no more ruined than if they had gone into an unsuccessful mining deal or put an unfortunate bank at baccarat at the club. They have played for a big stake and they have had no little excitement—which is not the least of their compensations, as he will agree who has known the unrelieved monotony of places like Guayaquil or Tegucigalpa. On the whole, no one who has engaged in the revolution and come out alive has lost anything but time—which is no great loss in Latin-America.

But the profits of the victors are limited solely by their ability to exact money from every available source without rousing sufficient hostility to be turned out of office. The fortunes accumulated by such captains of revolutionary industry as José Santos Zelaya and Cipriano Castro are stupendous; both began with nothing. One financial genius, who was acting President of a South-American country for only two months, cleared a million dollars so cleverly that he was able to continue to live unmolested among the people whom he had robbed. Few if any Latin-American countries are so developed that colossal fortunes may not still

be made in exploiting them; these are the rewards of success in politics.

If the greedy politician must resort to revolution to secure his opportunity, he knows at least that the game is worth the candle. There is no country in Latin-America in which the spoils of office are not almost incredibly great, no country in which the frankest corruption is not inseparable from the administration of the Government and the conduct of business having to do with the Government. The very condition of impoverishment in which constant revolutions leave these countries is one of the most potent factors in the perpetuation of revolutions; for the state of economic uncertainty which they induce affords the ambitious no other means of livelihood even comparable to politics. So long as the Latin-American can defend his course, as he does defend it both to himself and to every one else, by reference to the indisputable ethical and logical justifications of revolution which I have been at some pains to analyze, and so long as revolution is at all hazards a profitable and, when successful, the most profitable commercial enterprise open to him, there is no valid reason to expect him to desist.

It may be just enough to contend that the only substantial remedy for all of this is to be found in a truer conception of democracy, in the education of the people, in actual exercise of the franchise, and the consequent assumption by all classes of the responsibilities of representative government. No doubt this is so. But it is no truer in Latin-America than it is in the United States. It cannot be done in a day nor a decade; and it can never be done by working on a basis of conditions as they exist in Latin-America at present. Yet the fact that the regeneration of Latin-America will require much time and infinite patience is not a reason why great material good should not result from more immediate though empirical reforms. On the contrary, were peace and stability of government assured, by whatever agency, in every country of Latin-America, as they are assured in Panama and Cuba, there is every ground for believing that a reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters must follow. Indeed, with the unquestioned brilliancy and logic which, much more than with us, governs his conduct, one might hope to achieve through the Latin-American a better solution of the prob-

lems of popular government than any yet reached. But the Latin-American is far too practical to undertake this for purely sentimental reasons; so long as existing conditions support him in reasonable comfort, he will no more set about altering them than would we; and it is idle to try to flatter or beguile him into it. Change, if there is to be any, must come from without—and must come whether the Latin-American like it or not.

We only deceive ourselves in considering him either impractical or sentimental in this, his peculiarly astute improvement of the position in which we have placed him; and in so much as we deceive ourselves, we are incapacitated for any useful action in correction of conditions. The Latin-American will continue, not without reason, to despise our curious guilelessness, to play our gullibility, to profit of our tergiversation, our sentimentality. Why should he not? It is we who have placed and kept him where he is, and it is the foreign—principally the European—investor who suffers, who patiently rebuilds between outbreaks what the politicians in their struggle destroy. The Latin-American knows that the despite which he may put upon the European is nothing to us; and he knows that the hands of the European are tied by the Monroe Doctrine. We, of the United States, bear the responsibility of this false situation; ever since the Monroe Doctrine guaranteed the integrity of the republics of Latin-America, what they might do with their liberty has been our problem, not theirs. “We could not view *any* interposition for the purpose of . . . controlling *in any manner* their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition *toward the United States.*” The italics are mine, but the words are those of President Monroe’s message.

Our purpose was avowedly selfish; the advantage that the Latin-American republics have taken of the example we set has not been less so. Of this we are estopped from complaining; but neither need we delude ourselves. There is not and never was anything altruistic about the transaction, and it is preposterous to expect the Latin-American to display a large high-mindedness where we, his mentors in liberty, have shown none. With him his unique situation is as much a practical business opportunity as the European wars of the early part of the nineteenth century were to us. It is only by recognizing this, by ceasing to be sentimental

over it, and by handling the problem of actual, existing conditions—for which we are largely responsible—with clear-headed and unhesitating business acumen, that we may honestly discharge instead of shirk our duty. Mr. Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1904, is all the ground that we need to proceed upon; the nations of Europe, the Latin-American republics themselves await our action. That any course we may decide to adopt be consistent, impartial, unflinching and pursued to its logical end—this alone is required for success. And this alone can inspire in our Latin-American neighbors a respect which, hitherto, we have neither deserved nor received.

PAXTON HIBBEN.